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DISCOVERY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
IN CIVIL TAX PROCEEDINGS
CONVERSE MURDOCH-[
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS ARTICLE is intended as an exposition of the present state
of the law with respect to the rights of taxpayers to pretrial dis-
covery against the United States in civil tax proceedings. The article
is not intended as an exposition of all rules having to do with discovery
against the United States in all civil litigation. However, to the extent
decisions in nontax cases are applicable by analogy, they will be men-
tioned and discussed. No attempt will be made to set forth the law
regarding discovery in criminal proceedings.
As a matter of fairness to readers, the author proposes to state
at this point some of his predilections and philosophies in the hope
that a confession of the author's biases will enable the reader to better
understand his comments regarding the present rules and to judge
the value of his recommendations.
It is one of the author's tenets that since the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity from suit and has agreed to submit its
tax controversies with its citizens to decisions by independent judges,
the Government and the taxpayer should appear before the courts as
equal litigants in all respects.'
Unless there is an overpowering reason to give the Government a
procedural preference in tax litigation, the Government and the taxpayer
should have like responsibilities to each other and to the courts. It is
t Member of the New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware Bars. A.B., Bowdoin
College, 1941; LL.B., Columbia University, 1947; LL.M., Georgetown University, 1951.
1. In Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge
Augustus Hand observed:
It has been the policy of the American as well as of the English courts to treat
the government when appearing as a litigant like any private individual. Any
other practice would strike at the personal responsibility of governmental agencies
which is at the base of our institutions.
See also O'Riley, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign
Immunity, 21 N.C. L. Rtv. 1, 13 (1942) where the author observed:
On the other hand, unnecessary insistence upon unlimited privileges for a "favored
suitor" might be "an unjust and tyrannical exercise of power." A Government
whose rights are without measure is worse than one whose rights are no greater
than those of its citizens.
(58)
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submitted that any rule which tends to give the Government a pro-
cedural advantage over taxpayers involves some derogation of due
process which should be accepted only on the basis of some clearly
defined policy consideration and a showing of necessity. In no event
should a procedural preference be given to the Government merely
because, absent such preference, the Government might experience
difficulty in winning a lawsuit or in defeating a claim by a taxpayer.
Once it has been determined that the Government is enjoying a pro-
cedural advantage over taxpayers, a continuation of such preference
should never be based on the often voiced argument that "the Gov-
ernment always does things that way."
A second of the author's basic tenets is that the procedural rules
applicable in tax litigation (as in all litigation) should be fashioned
with a view to securing an early and full disclosure of all facts having
a bearing on the issues. This is not to say that an advocate for either
a taxpayer or the Government is to be criticized if he fails to im-
mediately and voluntarily disclose to his opponent or the court all
information about the case of which he has knowledge or even if he
hopes to surprise his opponent at trial and to thereby gain an advan-
tage. It is to say that the courts, in promulgating rules and in deciding
cases, and the Congress, in enacting laws, should do so having in mind
the ultimate objective of an expeditious and complete disclosure of all
relevant facts with a minimum of annoyance and expense. It is not
suggested that the players in the "game" of tax litigation should be
required to expose their hand to their opponent as soon as the cards
are dealt. It is suggested, however, that those who frame the rules
with respect to the "game" should do so with the object of having all
cards played as soon as possible and exposed face up.
In urging procedural rules which will tend toward early and
full disclosure, the author is not urging the abandonment of long-
recognized privileges such as the attorney-client confidential communica-
tions privilege or the state secrets privilege. Certain rules, having the
effect of preventing full disclosure, have been developed because it has
been learned through long experience that involuntary disclosures under
certain circumstances can lead to greater evils than those attendant on
the banning of such disclosures. There is no question that the privilege
against self-incrimination tends to conceal from disclosure much in-
formation which would be highly relevant and often dispositive of
litigated issues. Nonetheless, long and bitter experience has shown that
the evils associated with extracting self-incriminating evidence from
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II. AVAILABILITY OF DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
DEPENDENT UPON FORUM
In income, estate, and gift tax cases, a taxpayer ordinarily has a
choice of three forums in which to litigate. He can petition the Tax
Court for a redetermination of a deficiency proposed by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue,2 or he can sue for refund in either the
appropriate United States District Court' or in the United States
Court of Claims.4 In the case of taxes other than income, estate, and
gift, the taxpayer's choice is between a district court or the Court of
Claims. There are myriad factors which influence a taxpayer or his
counsel in the selection of a forum in which to litigate tax liabilities,
and the availability of pretrial discovery is an important one to be
taken into account.
Generally, a suit for refund in a district court furnishes the
greatest opportunities for pretrial discovery because the procedures in
tax refund suits are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The principal rules having to do with pretrial discovery are rule 16
(pretrial conferences), rule 26 (depositions upon oral examination or
written interrogatories), rule 27 (perpetuation of testimony before
commencement of an action or pending appeal), rule 34 (orders to
parties for production, inspection and copying of documents), and rule
36 (demands for admissions). The application of these rules, and
the satellite procedural rules in the multitude of civil litigation which
is handled by the United States district courts, has produced a great
body of decisional law. In general, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are extremely liberal with respect to pretrial discovery matters.
Proceedings in the Court of Claims are not governed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Court of Claims has
adopted its own rules of procedure which, in many respects, closely
parallel the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The principle Court of
Claims rules involving pretrial discovery are rule 18 (securing pro-
duction of documents and information in the possession of the Govern-
ment in order to frame an adequate petition), rule 30 (pretrial discovery
depositions through oral examination or written interrogatories), rule
38 (having to do with the scope of discovery), rule 39 (having to do
with a "call" upon a Government department or agency or any other
party for information or papers), rule 40 (production of documents for
inspection and copying), rule 42 (requests for admissions), rule 43
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213 [hereinafter references to the 1954 Code will
be by section only].
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (1964).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
[VOL. 13 : p. 58
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(pretrial orders, including orders for admissions and examinations
of financial records and stipulations and agreements between parties),
and rule 44 (pretrial conferences). As with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court of Claims discovery rules are liberal and obviously
were designed to compel early and full disclosure of facts. In the district
courts, most pretrial discovery is accomplished without the necessity
of securing an order of the court. An exception to this is rule 34, which
requires an order after a motion showing good cause for the production
by a party of documents. By contrast, the Court of Claims discovery
procedures require parties to initiate the action by seeking an order
of the court.' Nonetheless, in practice, aside from the slight delay
occasioned by the necessity of securing Court of Claims orders for
initiation of discovery, there is very little practical difference between
the workings of a district court and the Court of Claims in the matter
of pretrial discovery.
Because of the much greater aggregate volume of litigation handled
by the federal district courts and because of the narrower spectrum of
cases handled by the Court of Claims, the Court of Claims has not de-
veloped the great body of decisional law with respect to its discovery
rules as has developed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, if certainty with respect to the availability of pretrial
discovery is important in selecting a forum for tax litigation, the lawyer
charged with the responsibility of making the selection can proceed
into a district court with the greater assurance which comes from
numerous judicial pronouncements regarding the scope of the discovery
rules.
As in the case of the Court of Claims, the Tax Court of the United
States does not operate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Tax Court has adopted its own rules of procedure.6 However,
unlike the rules of the Court of Claims, the Tax Court rules with respect
to discovery do not parallel the discovery provisions in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, the Tax Court rules do not
expressly mention pretrial discovery and there is a dearth of published
materials with respect to the matter of pretrial discovery in Tax Court
proceedings.7
For a number of years, the Tax Court granted motions for per-
petuation of testimony in advance of the initiation of a proceeding in
5. The Court of Claims has delegated to its various Commissioners the power
to act for the court in most matters pending before them. See CT. CL. R. 4.
6. The Tax Court's authority to promulgate procedural rules is found in § 7453.
7. In Starr v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 721, 722 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 993 (1956) aff'g 13 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 277 (1954), the court observed
that the failure of the Tax Court rules to permit pretrial discovery did not amount
to an unconstitutional denial of due process.
FALL 1967]
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the Tax Court; that is, prior to the filing of a petition for redetermina-
tion of a deficiency. So far as can be determined, these orders of the
Tax Court permitting perpetuation of testimony in advance of the
formal commencement of a Tax Court proceeding were not publicly
reported and certainly were not officially reported.
On April 20, 1961, the Tax Court, in an unpublished order,
granted a motion by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to per-
petuate the testimony of a director of a corporate taxpayer at a time
when the taxpayer had not filed a petition in the Tax Court. The
Government there pointed out that the corporate director whose deposi-
tion was desired was suffering from cancer and was expected to live
only a short time. The taxpayer petitioned the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals for review of the order of the Tax Court, and in Louisville
Builders Supply Co. v. Commissioner,8 the court of appeals reversed
the Tax Court, holding that the Tax Court was without authority to
issue such an order. The court of appeals, after observing that the Tax
Court is a creature of congressional enactment and an "independent
agency in the Executive Branch of the Government," 9 stated: "its
[the Tax Court's] powers must be limited to what has been given to
it by specific Act of Congress and by its own rules adopted pursuant to
Congressional authority, § 7453 . . . plus such powers as may be
inherent in it as such agency and as such quasi judicial body.''
The Government argued that there were two sources of authority
for the Tax Court's order for perpetuation of testimony in advance
of a formal proceeding. First, it was argued that Tax Court Rule 45,
which deals with depositions, contemplated the taking of pre-petition
depositions. The cited rule, after setting forth the time limitations
applicable to applications for the taking of depositions, concludes:
"Provided, further, that under special circumstances, and for good
cause shown, the court may otherwise order." The Government pointed
to the just-quoted language as support for the proposition that the rule
contemplated pre-petition depositions. The court of appeals rejected
this argument and stated that the quoted proviso was intended only
to give the court authority to vary the otherwise stated time limitations
with respect to filing of applications for the taking of depositions.
The Government asserted as the second basis for the Tax Court's
authority to issue the challenged order the provision of section 7453
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which states:
The proceedings of the Tax Court and its divisions shall be con-
ducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure
8. 294 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1961).
9. Id. at 339.
10. Id. [citations omitted].
[VOL. 13 : p. 58
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(other than rules of evidence) as the Tax Court may prescribe
and in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in trials
without a jury in the United States District Court of the District
of Columbia.
The Government argued that the matter of taking a pre-petition
deposition to perpetuate testimony was either (1) a procedural matter
other than one relating to evidence - in which case Tax Court Rule
45 supported the Tax Court's action - or (2) it was a matter involving
a rule of evidence in which case the provision of the District of Colum-
bia Code" authorizing the District Court for the District of Columbia
to grant petitions for perpetuation of testimony was applicable in the
Tax Court by adoption as an evidentiary rule pursuant to section
7453.
The court of appeals observed that even if Tax Court Rule 45 and
the just-cited section of the District of Columbia Code could form the
basis for the order for a pre-petition deposition for the perpetuation of
testimony, nonetheless the rule and the section of the District of
Columbia Code did not expressly provide for discovery proceedings
either before or after the institution of a proceeding.
The Government also relied on section 7456(a) as authority for
the Tax Court order. That section provides in part that: "For the
efficient administration of the functions vested in the Tax Court . . .
any judge of the Tax Court . . . may . . . require . . . the taking of
a deposition before any designated individual competent to administer
oaths under this title." The taxpayer argued that the just-quoted statute
was only applicable to cases pending in the Tax Court by virtue of the
prior filing of a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency asserted
in a statutory notice of deficiency. The court of appeals rejected the
Government argument on this point as follows:
However, we decline to hold that a Tax Court judge's right to
require "the taking of a deposition" comprehends procedural
authority to order the pre-proceeding and pre-trial taking of a
deposition to discover and perpetuate testimony. Where such
authority exists in our state and federal courts, it is specifically
provided by rule or statute.'
2
Read literally, the opinion of the Sixth Circuit in the Louisville
case casts serious doubt on the authority of the Tax Court to order
discovery depositions even after the filing of a petition for redetermina-
tion. Under the particular facts of the Louisville case, however, the
11. D.C. CODn ANN. § 14-201 (9:3) (1951).
12. 294 F.2d at 341.
FALL 1967]
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comments of the court of appeals regarding the authority of the Tax
Court, under its then existing rules, to order pretrial discovery deposi-
tions after the filing of a petition is pure dicta. The Louisville case
involved an attempt by the Tax Court to order depositions before the
court had acquired jurisdiction of the case by the normal method.
All that was necessary for the court of appeals to decide was that there
was no statute or rule expressly allowing such pre-petition depositions.
In any event, there is nothing in the holding of the court which would
expressly preclude the Tax Court from now amending its rules to at
least permit post-petition pretrial discovery depositions.
Following the reversal of the Tax Court in the Louisville case, a
taxpayer filed a petition in the Tax Court to perpetuate the testimony
of a doctor who was familiar with the financial and medical history
of a decedent." There, in connection with the audit of the estate tax
return, Internal Revenue agents were proposing to assert that certain
of decedent's transfers were transfers in contemplation of death. The
petitioner alleged that the Internal Revenue Service had not yet issued
a statutory notice of deficiency and, therefore, he was unable to petition
the Tax Court for a redetermination. Under these circumstances, the
petitioner requested that the court order the taking of a pre-petition
deposition of the doctor. The Commissioner moved to deny the peti-
tioner's application and the matter was set down for argument before
Chief Judge Tietjens. Counsel for the taxpayer did not participate
in the argument. During the course of the argument, Chief Judge
Tietjens noted that the taxpayer's petition conformed to a practice
which had been followed by the Tax Court for a number of years.
Government counsel agreed that in prior cases the Tax Court had
allowed such petitions but argued that in the light of the Louisville
decision of the Sixth Circuit there was now a serious question as to
whether such prior practice was authorized. Chief Judge Tietjens held
that in view of the ruling of the Sixth Circuit in the Louisville case,
the Tax Court would deny the petition.
Daniel A. Robida 4 was a Tax Court proceeding involving the
issue of whether the petitioner was entitled, under section 911, to ex-
clude certain income received in Germany. The Tax Court intriguingly
described the petitioner's German income as follows:
This "tax exempt" income was reported by petitioner on his
returns as having been earned income abroad as a sales promoter
and instructor in the operation of machines under the terms of an
13. Estate of Bernard A. Marx, 40 T.C. 1 (1963).
14. 24 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mern. 451 (1965).
[VOL. 13 : p. 58
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employment agreement with Service Games Ltd. of Gotenda,
Tokyo. On the return for 1961 petitioner's services under the
agreement were described as "repairs of machines by soliciting,
teaching and practicing the diagnosing and the manipulating of
machines." Service Games Ltd. was a manufacturer of slot
machines. 5
The Government had computed asserted deficiencies on a net worth
basis. The taxpayer's original counsel withdrew from the case before
trial and at the trial the taxpayer acted as his own counsel. The tax-
payer testified that German officials had seized all of his records which
would have enabled him to prove the correct amount of his income
and that the Internal Revenue Service had, in turn, received these
records from the German officials. The Tax Court made the following
comment about this situation:
These allegations are unsupported by the record, except for the
petitioner's own testimony, and what they [the taxpayer's records
seized by German officials and turned over to the United States
authorities] would have shown, had they been available, is nebu-
lous. The taxpayer had the burden of proof, and the impossi-
bility of proving a material fact does not relieve him of that
burden.' 6
The case went to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 7
where the Government "in the interests of complete fairness"'" moved
that the case be remanded to the Tax Court for further but limited
proceedings. The court of appeals, after describing the seizure of the
taxpayer's records by the German officials, stated:
The respondent [Commissioner of Internal Revenue] admits that
the Revenue Service, through other agencies of the United States,
obtained a portion of petitioner's records from the German police.
These records were not made available to petitioner prior to the
hearing in the Tax Court. It is because of this that the respondent
has moved for remand.
19
In light of the court of appeals' statement that the Government
itself conceded that it had certain of the taxpayer's records, there is a
certain irony associated with the Tax Court's dismissal of the tax-
payer's contention in this regard as being unsupported except by the
15. Id. at 452.
16. Id. at 455.
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taxpayer's own testimony. The court of appeals granted the Govern-
ment's motion for a remand, but went on to say:
We believe, however, that there should not be a sharp limitation
upon further proceedings. It will be appropriate for petitioner to
engage in discovery proceedings to the end that he may obtain
all of his necessary personal records or that the respondent may
attempt to make a satisfactory showing as to why records not
in its possession, if such records exist, have not been obtained or
cannot be obtained.2 °
It is interesting to contrast the opinion of the Sixth Circuit in the
Louisville case, where the court of appeals strictly construed the juris-
diction of the Tax Court in what it perceived to be discovery proceed-
ings, with the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in the Robida case, in which
the appellate court indicated that discovery proceedings were essential
to enable the taxpayer to adequately prepare his case for trial.
A recently settled Tax Court proceeding involved a taxpayer
known as Rose Kennedy. That case appears to contain the seeds of new
growth with respect to discovery in the Tax Court. In the Rose
Kennedy' case, the Government had asserted sizable income tax de-
ficiencies based upon alleged gambling income. The taxpayer charged
that the Government's deficiency contention was in large part based
upon evidence secured by the Chicago Police Department in a manner
which the state courts of Illinois had said constituted an illegal search
and seizure. The taxpayer's counsel filed a motion to suppress any
illegally obtained evidence in the hands of the Government, to compel
the production of evidence in the Government's hands in order to
enable the taxpayer to determine whether it was illegally obtained, and
to take the discovery deposition of the examining revenue agent in
order to determine what materials in their files were tainted evidence.
Judge Dawson ordered the holding of a pretrial hearing at which time
the taxpayer was to have the opportunity to take the testimony of the
examining revenue agent with a view to discovering facts relevant
to the possible suppression of evidence in the Government's hands. The
case was settled on a basis which apparently amounted to a complete
taxpayer victory. As a result, there will be no published opinion. How-
ever, the actions taken by the trial judge in that case promise to break
new ground in the field of discovery in Tax Court cases.
The situations facing the taxpayers in the Robida and the Rose
Kennedy cases point up the practical necessity of the Tax Court estab-
20. Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
21. T.C. Dkt. 4945-66 (filed 1966).
[VOL. 13 : p. 58
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lishing effective pretrial discovery for taxpayers. As the Tax Court
observed in the Robida case, the taxpayer there had the burden of dis-
proving the correctness of the Commissioner's determination. As it
developed, at least some of the evidence which was essential for the
taxpayer's case was in the Government's possession. Absent a right
in the taxpayer to engage in discovery proceedings, it was a practical
impossibility for the taxpayer to adequately prepare for a trial at which
he had the burden of proof. Under such circumstances, to insist that
the taxpayer must wait until trial and then and there attempt to build
his case by examining government agents is unrealistic. In the absence
of pretrial discovery, a taxpayer, in such a situation, has no assurance
that the Government will have any revenue agents present at the trial
and subject to examination by the taxpayer. Even if some revenue
agents are produced by the Government at the trial (despite the absence
of a government burden of proof), the taxpayer can have no advance
assurance that there will be present in the courtroom and subject to
his examination all of the Internal Revenue Service personnel who
have materials which would enable him to carry his burden of proof.
Further, assuming that at the hearing the Government produced all of
its personnel who had any information about the case, there would still
be no assurance that such government personnel would have with them
all records and files which would enable the taxpayer to establish his
case. Lastly, even assuming that the Government produced at the trial
all of its personnel having knowledge of the facts and all documents
and records having any bearing on the case, it is obvious that the trial
would become needlessly protracted if it was necessary to interrupt
and give the taxpayer or his counsel adequate time for careful study
of the records. Thus, under circumstances such as were present in the
Robida case, pretrial discovery proceedings are a must if the taxpayer
is to be given a meaningful day in court and if the business of the court
is not to be disrupted by an attempt to do during a trial session
what can better be done during a pretrial discovery proceeding.
Where, as in the Rose Kennedy case, the taxpayer is asserting
that certain evidence in the hands of the Government was illegally
obtained, a failure to grant pretrial discovery to the taxpayer is even
more inhibitive to due process and conducive to disorganization in the
court proceedings. There, the taxpayer made the serious charge that
an Internal Revenue agent had used illegally procured evidence. Under
such circumstances, it is most unlikely that at the time of trial the
Government will come into the courtroom with the materials and per-
sonnel which will enable the taxpayer to prove that the evidence in the
Government's hands is tainted and, therefore, inadmissible. Again,
FALL 1967]
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assuming that the Government produces at the trial all personnel and
records which will enable the taxpayer to prove the illegality of the
Government's evidence, it is not hard to imagine the disorganization
of the Tax Court's trial calendar if one of the trials is diverted into a
long hearing regarding the methods by which the Government's evidence
was secured. Inquiries with respect to matters like this ordinarily
result in one witness giving leads to other witnesses. These leads in
turn require the examining party to follow-up with additional subpoenas
and examinations. It is not conducive to the orderly trial of cases to
insist on a procedure which requires such follow-up investigations and
examinations thereby resulting in long hiatuses in the trial.
In summary, the situation with respect to the availability of dis-
covery in the three principal tax litigation forums is as follows:
1. By virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
large body of decisional law developed by repeated interpretation
and application of these rules in the many district courts, a district
court refund suit furnishes the best opportunity for a full pretrial
discovery by either the taxpayer or the Government.
2. The Rules of the Court of Claims, while providing for
fairly liberal discovery procedures closely akin to those applicable
in the district courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
do not have directly behind them a large body of decisional law
comparable to that which has developed with respect to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Court of Claims must rank
behind a district court as a forum in which a taxpayer or the
Government can expect to achieve maximum pretrial discovery.
3. The Tax Court is the least desirable forum in terms of
supplying opportunities for the taxpayer to engage in pretrial
discovery. Nonetheless, on the basis of recent developments, it is
to be anticipated that in the near future the Tax Court will, of its
own volition, or by virtue of appellate court decisions, move toward
a greater use of pretrial discovery procedures.
It is submitted that, notwithstanding the present absence of
provisions in the Tax Court rules for pretrial discovery, all courts
should provide for pretrial discovery in tax litigation. Moreover, liberal
utilization of the currently extant procedures is particularly appropriate
in federal tax litigation, for even where discovery rules are liberally
administered, the taxpayer starts out in an underdog position. The
reasons for these conclusions are based primarily on the administra-
tive procedure that is utilized by the Internal Revenue Service.
In most nontax litigation, both sides embark upon judicial pro-
ceedings with roughly comparable knowledge (or roughly comparable
ignorance, as the case may be) of the evidence and contentions of the
[VOL. 13 : p. 58
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opponent. Such is not the case in the typical federal tax litigation.
Most tax litigation reaches the courts only after there have been
extended administrative proceedings including the Government's ex-
amination of a return filed by a taxpayer, an examination by the Internal
Revenue Service of the taxpayer's books and records, a Government
conducted examination (sometimes under oath, more often not) of the
taxpayer and anyone else having knowledge of the facts, and the sub-
mission of protests and claims spelling out the taxpayer's contentions
with respect to the facts and the law. Thus, in the majority of federal
tax cases, the Government has extensive knowledge of the taxpayer's
side of the case before a complaint or petition is ever filed through the
use of the practical equivalents of all the available discovery techniques
which ordinary litigants can utilize only after a lawsuit is started. The
Government has the power during the course of an investigation to not
only examine books and records of the taxpayer but also to subpoena the
taxpayer and others to appear and give testimony under oath.2" No such
investigatory power is available to a taxpayer prior to the commence-
ment of an action, with the exception of the limited circumstances
where, pursuant to rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a taxpayer may petition for the perpetuation of testimony in advance of
starting a tax refund suit in a district court.
It can fairly be said that in tax litigation, the Government enters
the lists with the advantage of having had the opportunity to or
having actually engaged in what amounts to discovery, whereas the
taxpayer, even positing the existence of discovery in the forum, has
not had an opportunity for disclosure with respect to the facts known
by the Government and the contentions of the Government until the liti-
gation actually commences.
III. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
The following discussion is designed to outline the general pro-
cedures available for discovery in the federal district courts -as well as
the particular problems encountered in litigation with the Internal
Revenue Service. As indicated earlier, the discovery available in the
Court of Claims is, for practical purposes, equivalent to that available
22. See §§ 7601-09. In United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967),
reversing and remanding an order of the District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, the court of appeals held the Government was entitled to cause the produc-
tion of an appraiser's report regarding valuation of unlisted stock included in a
decedent's estate. The taxpayer resisted the summons to produce the appraisal report
on the basis of the attorney-client and the attorney's work product privileges. The
court of appeals expressed doubt that the attorney's work product privilege applies
in an administrative investigation but held that even if the privilege is available in
other than a judicial proceeding, the appraiser's report in the instant case was not
protected by the privilege.
FALL 1967]
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in the district courts. For this reason, discovery in the Court of
Claims will not be specifically considered.
In 1942, the Government took the position that the provisions
of the Federal Rules with respect to discovery were not applicable
to the United States. However, in United States v. General Motors
Corp.2" the district court disagreed and held that the Federal Rules
are applicable to the United States except to the extent that the United
States is expressly excepted from them, and the Government has long
since conceded that the Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with discovery
are applicable to the United States.24
The words of rule 262" referring to discovery by deposition or in-
terrogatory and the voluminous commentary about its provisions make
it clear that it is intended to permit the broadest type of discovery. The
rule expressly negates the idea that discovery must be limited to evi-
dence which will be admissible at the trial by providing that discovery
may be had for the purpose of gathering leads for the discovery of
admissible evidence.
Rules 30 28 and 3127 contemplate that a party wishing to make
discovery by depositions involving oral testimony or written inter-
23. 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942). The Government had contended that where
the Government was not expressly mentioned in a discovery rule, the rule was not
applicable by virtue of the rule of construction to the effect that a statute which does
not mention the sovereign by name is not applicable to the sovereign.
24. See Brief for Appellant at 56, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
25. Rule 26 provides that any party may take the testimony of any person, in-
cluding a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for
the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes.
The rule states that the deponent:
may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of relevant facts [and that] it is not ground for objec-
tion that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
26. Rule 30. Depositions Upon Oral Examination
(a) Notice of Examination: Time and Place. A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in
writing to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and
place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be
examined, if known, and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient
to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion
of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown
enlarge or shorten the time. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
27. Rule 31. Depositions of Witnesses Upon Written Interrogatories
(a) Serving Interrogatories; Notice. A party desiring to take the deposition
of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other
party with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer
them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom
the deposition is to be taken. Within 10 days thereafter a party so served may
serve cross interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition. With-
in 5 days thereafter the latter may serve redirect interrogatories upon a party
who has served cross interrogatories. Within 3 days after being served with
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rogatories may do so without first securing an order of court. The
discovery process is initiated by a party merely giving formal notice in
writing to other parties to the action. In tax cases the time and place
for the taking of depositions is usually handled by informal agreement
between counsel. The informality of arranging depositions or serving
interrogatories under rules 26, 30 and 31 is to be contrasted with the
procedures under rule 34 for the production and copying of documents
where an order of court must be sought.
28
Rule 36 permits a party to serve on another party a written
request for admission of facts or the genuineness of attached copies of
documents.29 In a sense rule 36 furnishes a form of discovery in that
it enables a taxpayer to confirm, in advance of trial, that the Govern-
ment does not intend to controvert obvious facts. However, unlike
discovery under rule 26, requests for admissions under rule 36 are
confined to facts and documents which are "relevant." Accordingly,
rule 36 does not furnish a tool for discovering "irrelevant" informa-
tion which may lead to "relevant" evidence.
In tax litigation, requests for admissions under rule 36 are pe-
culiarly appropriate for purposes of getting into the record early in the
redirect interrogatories, a party may serve recross interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition. FD. R. Civ. P. 31(a).
28. Rule 34 requires that a party make a motion showing "good cause" and
requesting an order of the court directed to a party to the proceeding "to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing . . . of any designated docu-
ments, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things not
privileged." FgD. R. Civ. P. 34. Rule 34 permits the issuance of orders only to other
parties to the proceeding, whereas rule 26 permits the taking of the deposition of
either a party or a non-party.
29. Rule 36. Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents
(a) Request for Admission. After commencement of an action a party may
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of
the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited with the
request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request.
If a plaintiff desires to serve a request within 10 days after commencement of the
action leave of court, granted with or without notice, must be obtained. Copies of
the documents shall be served with the request unless copies have already been
furnished. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, not less than 10
days after service thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may
allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon
the party requesting the admission either (1) a sworn statement denying specific-
ally the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written
objections on the ground that some or all of the requested admissions are
privileged or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in
part, together with a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable
time. If written objections to a part of the request are made, the remainder of
the request shall be answered within the period designated in the request. A
denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good
faith requires that a party deny only a part or a qualification of a matter of
which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
deny only the remainder. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948.
(b) Effect of Admission. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such
request is for the purpose of the pending action only and neither constitutes an
admission by him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any
other proceeding. Fv. R. Civ. P. 36(a) (b).
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litigation fairly routine matters such as the copies of tax returns, cor-
respondence between the taxpayer, his representatives and government
representatives, revenue agents' reports which have been submitted to
the taxpayer, statutory notices of deficiencies, and refund claims.
Requests for admissions under rule 36 are also helpful in establishing
amounts and dates of payment of taxes, deficiency assessments, interest,
penalties, and the like, as well as jurisdictional facts such as the
time of filing returns, times of payments of tax and claiming of refunds,
and residence of the taxpayers.
It often happens that the Government in its pleadings will deny
what, to the taxpayer, seems an incontrovertible fact, such as the date
of filing a tax return or payment of a tax. The Government's denials
of such allegations often stem from the fact that the Government's
records show a slightly later date for the filing of a return or payment
of a tax than do the taxpayer's records. This can arise because the
taxpayer assumes that when he mails a return or a tax payment the date
of filing or date of payment will be deemed to be the date of mailing or
will not be more than a few days later. The Government's files, on the
other hand, usually reflect the date when a clerk makes an entry in an
official government form or impresses a date stamp. This can occur
several days or even several weeks after the receipt of the return
or payment check in the mail room of the particular Internal Revenue
Service office involved. Usually the discrepancies between the dates
shown on the taxpayer's records and those shown in the Internal
Revenue Service records are minor. Resolution of this problem can
often be accomplished by the taxpayer accepting the dates shown in
government records and requesting an admission under rule 36 that
the date shown in the Government's records is the date of filing or pay-
ment. Precipitate acceptance of a government record date for the
filing of a document or the payment of a tax may be dangerous where
the difference between the date shown in the taxpayer's records and
that shown in the Government's records is significant in terms of periods
of limitation or where the difference results in substantial differences in
interest computations.
On the assumption that the taxpayer has been able to "clear out
the underbrush" by securing satisfactory responses from the Govern-
ment to requests for admissions under rule 36, the taxpayer is next
faced with a decision as to whether he wishes to engage in further
pretrial discovery proceedings and if so, what avenue of approach he
intends to use.
Rule 34 requires that the taxpayer show good cause in order that
his motion requesting the production of specific documents be granted.
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In the normal course of events, discovery by an order to produce under
rule 34 is subsequent to exhaustion of other discovery procedures.
This is the practice because the framing of an adequate motion under
rule 34 for the production of specific documents in the hands of the
Government, often requires, as a practical necessity, that the taxpayer
first proceed by oral deposition or written interrogatories pursuant to
rule 26 in order to ascertain what significant documents are in the pos-
session of the government.
A. Discovery of Information Known to Participants in the
Internal Revenue Audit
In the usual case involving tax litigation in the district courts,
the taxpayer is the plaintiff and the United States is the defendant.
Although cases in which the United States is the plaintiff in a district
court tax case are somewhat rare, they do arise in situations in which
the United States is suing to quiet title to property where title is
derived from the enforcement of a tax lien,"0 to enforce a tax lien,"1
to subject a decedent's property to a judgment for estate taxes,"2 or
for recovery of an erroneous refund."
The more usual case is a suit for the refund of federal taxes,
in which the taxpayer is the plaintiff and, therefore, has the burden
of proving that he has overpaid his taxes. 4 It is not sufficient that
the taxpayer prove that the Government was wrong in any particular
with respect to the assessment and collection of the tax - the taxpayer
must affirmatively prove the correct amount of taxes owed and that
such correct amount is less than the amount assessed and collected by the
Government.
35
Prior to a district court or Court of Claims refund suit an audit
is generally conducted in which the Internal Revenue Service takes
the position that there is a deficiency in tax attributable to a matter
which the Internal Revenue Service and the taxpayer's representatives
have discussed extensively. As to the particular matter which gave
rise to the deficiency assessment, the taxpayer and his representative
30. See § 7402(e).
31. See § 7403.
32. See § 7404.
33. See § 7405.
34. See Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932).
35. An exception to the burden of proof rule just stated is in cases in which the
Government has asserted a fifty per cent civil fraud penalty under § 6653(b). There
the Government has the burden of proof in the Tax Court, the district court, or the
Court of Claims. See § 7454 (relating to the Tax Court); Armstrong v. United
States, 354 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1965) and numerous cases collected in 10 J. MERTtNS,
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generally have a fair idea of the facts upon which the Government
relied in assessing the deficiency and of the legal theories behind the
assessment. However, this is not always so. In any event, when the
case reaches the refund suit stage, the taxpayer has no assurance that
the Government intends to limit the issues of the suit to those that were
the focus of the audit, because the service does not necessarily accept the
proposition that the taxpayer's computation of tax was in all ways correct
except with respect to the item which was the subject of controversy dur-
ing the earlier audit. This is the situation in which the ordinary taxpay-
er-plaintiff finds himself at the beginning of a suit for refund in the dis-
trict court or in the Court of Claims, and it is from this position that the
taxpayer-plaintiff must begin to prepare for trial. Obviously, discovery
with respect to the Government's case is helpful (if not essential) in
enabling the taxpayer to adequately prepare for trial by determining
the Government's position with respect to possible new bases for
resistance to the refund claim or new theories to refute the taxpayer's
position on the initial issue.
Generally, the taxpayer or his representatives know the identities
of revenue agents, conferees, and technical advisors in the Appellate
Division with whom they have discussed the case during audit stages.
However, taxpayers and their representatives are not always aware of
the identities of government representatives who have indirectly partici-
pated in the audits without ever having had direct contact with the
taxpayer or his representative. Likewise, the taxpayer may be ignorant
of persons in the Government, but outside of the Internal Revenue
Service, or persons outside of the Government who have given informa-
tion to the Internal Revenue Service with respect to the taxpayer's
liabilities. Determinations of the identities of these persons would seem
to be a proper subject for discovery pursuant to rule 26(b)"8 and pur-
suant to Court of Claims Rules 30 and 38. In attempting discovery
of the names of persons who have given information to the Government
in connection with the determination of the taxpayer's liabilities, con-
sideration must be given to the possible assertion by the Government
of the privilege against revealing the identities of informers.
8 7
Assuming determination of the identities of persons who in some
way participated in the tax audit, the taxpayer is next confronted with
the problem of how far he may go in examining such persons by
deposition or interrogatories or by requesting the production of docu-
ments prepared by, or in the hands of, government agents. There
36. See 4 J. MooRx, F4DAL PRcTict § 26.19[1] (2d ed. 1953).
37. See pp. 88-90 infra.
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seems to be no question that the taxpayer is entitled to discover and
confirm, by deposing the identified individuals, the fact that such indi-
viduals participated in the audit. Likewise, a taxpayer is entitled to
discover the actions taken by the identified individuals, i.e., whether
they wrote reports or conferred with others about the case and similar
matters.
It is equally clear that the taxpayer is entitled to secure, by deposi-
tion, interrogatories, or by an order to produce served upon govern-
ment agents, copies of statements given to government agencies by the
taxpayer himself."8 The discovery of the agents' versions of a tax-
payer's oral statements is especially important if there is any reason
to believe that the agents' versions of the conversations will be ma-
terially different from the taxpayer's recollection of the statements.
In cases in which the taxpayer's trial counsel has not participated in
all stages of the audit, it is important to seek, through discovery, copies
of all written statements given by the taxpayer or earlier representa-
tives of the taxpayer to avoid being surprised at trial by the sudden
production of statements given to the Internal Revenue Service, but
forgotten by the taxpayer in discussing the case with his present
counsel.
In the absence of some claim of privilege, the taxpayer would also
be entitled to discover factual materials known to agents and others
who participated in the audit and which were relied upon by the govern-
ment agents in reaching decisions with respect to matters arising in the
course of the audit.
B. Discovery of Internal Memoranda of the Internal
Revenue Service Personnel
When the taxpayer attempts to secure discovery with respect to
opinions, recommendations from one government agent to another,
and similar matters, he is entering an area where the law is far from
clear or settled. The courts have vacillated in their treatment of this
question. One of the initial cases presenting this problem was the
government contracts case of Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
United States,89 wherein Justice Reed (sitting by designation) held
that the Government could not be compelled to produce advisory reports
from subordinate government officials who made recommendations with
38. Brewer v. Hassett, 2 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass. 1942).
39. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. C1. 1958).
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respect to agency actions. The court held that the memorandum of
advice from a subordinate official was privileged."
In Cenname v. Bingler,4' an action for refund of cabaret taxes, the
taxpayer moved pursuant to rule 34, for the production of a report of
a revenue agent, a report of the Technical Division of the Appellate
Staff, and a report of a second revenue agent. The Government resisted
this demand and in opposition to it submitted an affidavit from the Act-
ing Commissioner of Internal Revenue, asserting a formal claim of
executive privilege as to the documents. The Government relied oil
the Kaiser case, among others, as supporting the proposition that the
demanded documents were privileged. The district court wrote a very
brief opinion, holding that the rule of the Kaiser case was applicable
and denied the plaintiff's motion.
In Continental Distilling Corp. v. Humphrey,42 a suit was insti-
tuted alleging that labelling regulations issued by the Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue were dis-
criminatory as between the plaintiff and competitive distillers. The
plaintiff sought the deposition of the Director of the Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax Division and issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring
his production of a great number of writings in the files of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue showing the background of the adoption of the
challenged regulation. The district court refused to quash the subpoena
requiring the appearance for deposition of the Director of the Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax Division. The court observed that if in the course of
the deposition questions were asked of the witness which the Govern-
ment believed called for revelation of privileged or confidential matters,
the availability of the privilege could be raised at that time. However,
the court observed: "Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of the mental
operations by which defendants [officials of the United States Treasury
Department] arrived at their opinions or made their judgments.""
40. Justice Reed stated:
So far as the disclosure of confidential intra-agency advisory opinions is con-
cerned, we conclude that they belong to that class of governmental documents
that are privilege from inspection as against public interest but not absolutely.
Viewing this claim of privilege for the intra-agency advisory opinion in its
entirety, we determine that the Government's claim of privilege for the document
is well founded. It would be definitely contrary to the public interest in our view
for such an advisory opinion on governmental course of action to be produced
by the United States under the coercion of a bar against production of any
evidence in defense of this suit for contract damages. Id. at 946-47.
41. 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 15,346 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
42. 17 F.R.D. 237 (D.D.C. 1955).
43. Id. at 241. The court quashed tile subpoena duces tecun; on the ground that
the validity of such subpoena was to be tested on the same basis as a motion under
rule 34 for the production of documents, and therefore, the moving party must show
good cause for the production of the documents. The court determined that the
plaintiff had failed to show such good cause.
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E. W. Bliss & Co. v. United States44 presented a similar situation.
The taxpayer sought production of transmittal letters to government
employees pursuant to rule 34. The court denied the motion for pro-
duction, stating that: "Good cause for the production of such documents
has not been shown, and, in the circumstances of this case the Govern-
ment's claim of privilege is well taken."45  This statement implies
either a misconstruction of the rule or an inexact reference to the
Government's defense as the assertion of a "privilege." By its terms
rule 34 precludes production of any documents which are "privileged."
Accordingly, under the rule, it should be irrelevant whether the moving
party has shown "good cause" if the documents are privileged. A more
rational basis for the court's decision is that in proceedings of this
kind the judge weighs the taxpayer's need for production of advisory
memoranda in the government files against the Government's interests
in preventing the taxpayer from seeing the internal memoranda.
The Court of Claims decision in the Kaiser case and the district
court decisions in the Continental Distilling and E. W. Bliss cases
represent the high water mark of government successes in protecting
from disclosure intra-agency memoranda and opinions reflecting recom-
mendations of government agents on the mere assertion of a public
policy or executive privilege argument.
An interesting situation was presented in Campbell v. Eastland.4 6
During the pendency of a criminal investigation for alleged tax fraud,
the taxpayer commenced a civil action for refund of income taxes. In
connection with the civil proceeding, the district court ordered the
Government to produce, pursuant to rule 34, the reports of special
agents who participated in the criminal investigation. The court of
appeals reversed on the ground that the taxpayer was merely engaging
in a gambit to achieve discovery in a criminal case. However, the
opinion of the court of appeals contains strong hints that if the criminal
proceedings were over, the taxpayer might well be entitled to examine
the agent's reports in connection with a purely civil proceeding.
In light of recent cases, however, it appears that the trend of the
decisions is toward liberality in permitting discovery of opinions
expressed by government personnel in connection with tax audits.4 7
44. 5 FED. RULES SERV. 2d § 34.42, Case 1 (M.D. Ohio 1961).
45. Id.
46. 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963) rev'g unre-
ported district court decision (E.D. Tex. 1961).
47. Professor Moore analyzes this area by stating: "The weight of authority
rejects questions calling for the opinions, legal conclusions or contentions of the
deponent." After reciting specific instances of the just-quoted generality, it is stated:
Most of the foregoing decisions give no reasoned explanation for their hold-
ings, simply relying on the proposition that questions as to matters of opinion,
legal conclusions or contentions are improper. Insofar as the courts have at-
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United States v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co.48 exemplifies this
recent trend. A suit was instituted by the Government to recover an
allegedly erroneous tax refund on the grounds that the refund was
based on a rule for computation of depletion later rejected by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Cannelton." In defending the
suit for recovery of the refund, the taxpayer attempted to show that its
refund had been subject to thorough review at all levels of the Internal
Revenue Service and had been submitted to the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation. The taxpayer moved under rule 34 for the
production of documents to enable it to "prepare its defense by deter-
mining the exact factual and legal basis on which the government claims
the refund was erroneously paid."5 The Government resisted this mo-
tion on the ground that the documents demanded were protected by an
"executive privilege," 51 the attorney-client privilege,5 2 or came under
the attorney's work product privilege. 3 The demanded documents in-
cluded memoranda between the various offices and officials of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, including the Appellate Division, the Regional
Counsel's office, the Audit Division of the national office, the engineer-
revenue agent, the Office of the Chief Counsel, and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. From the description of the documents set forth
in the district court's opinion, it is obvious that the documents must have
contained recommendations by, and opinions of, officials of the Internal
Revenue Service.
The judge, after noting that he had examined the demanded
documents in camera and had found that they revealed no military
or state secrets and that their production would not threaten the na-
tional security in any way, explained:
It would be unconscionable, under the circumstances, for the
Government to be permitted to prosecute this suit challenging its
tempted to rationalize this rule the most common basis asserted is that the dis-
covery process is intended to lead to the ascertainment of facts and nothing else.
There is nothing in the language of Rule 26(b) [of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] to require a decision that matters of opinion may never be called
for. The question should be, not whether as a theoretical matter the inquiry calls
for an expression of opinion, but rather whether it is practicable and feasible
to answer the inquiry and, if so, whether an answer might expedite the litigation
by either narrowing the area of controversy or avoiding unnecessary testimony
or providing a lead to evidence.
Recent decisions have adopted this reasoning and have allowed discovery of
opinions, contentions of fact and ultimate facts, such as [respects in which a
party was alleged to be negligent; the manner in which an accident occurred;
the scope of relevant market and existence of competition; and methods of com-
puting damages]. 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTicc 26.16[4] (2d ed. 1953).
48. 33 F.R.D. 513 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
49. 364 U.S. 76 (1960).
50. 33 F.R.D. at 514.
51. See pp. 84-88 infra.
52. See pp. 92-93 infra.
53. See pp. 90-92 infra.
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own prior determination of defendant's tax liability, and then
invoke governmental or attorney-client privileges, or the attorney's
work-product doctrine, to deprive the defendant of matters which
might be material to its defense. In this type of case the defendant
should not be kept in the dark, but, on the contrary, a full disclosure
should be made.
54
Such language indicates that the district judge's decision to permit
broad discovery of the Government's files was considerably influenced
by the fact that the Government was suing to recover a refund and
was thus before the court in a substantially changed position from that
taken when the refund was issued. The court undoubtedly felt that the
reversal in direction on the part of the Government entitled the taxpayer
to an explanation. Procedurally the San Antonio Portland Cement case
was atypical. In the usual tax case, the Government has generally main-
tained a consistent position throughout the controversy or, at least, has
consistently taken the position that the taxpayer owes more tax than
was reported on the original return.
United States v. Gates5 was another suit for recovery of an
allegedly erroneous tax refund involving the valuation of interests in
family businesses. The defendant (taxpayer) moved under rule 34 to
require the Government to produce documents prepared by the Internal
Revenue Service dealing with valuations of a closely held corporation's
stock and past tax returns of various family members. The district
court rejected the Government's claim of the attorney's work product
privilege and granted the motion of the taxpayer. It is not possible
to determine from the reported opinion the exact nature of the various
documents which the taxpayer sought. However, it seems clear from
the general description of the documents set forth in the court's opinion
that they involved intra-agency memoranda.
The district court judge in the Gates case, like the judge in the
San Antonio Portland Cement case, was obviously influenced by the
fact that the Government was the plaintiff seeking to reverse its
prior action. Although this unusual context could have been used to
limit the emerging trend of more liberal discovery, this was not the
case. The Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States"6 case arose in
the traditional posture of a taxpayer's refund suit, and the taxpayer
sought an order for the production of a miscellany of documents in
the Government's files. 7 The Government resisted these motions on
54. 33 F.R.D. at 515.
55. 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964).
56. 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
57. These included reports and memoranda of the Appellate Division; control
cards used in connection with the plaintiff's income and excess profits tax returns;
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the grounds that the taxpayer had failed to show "good cause" within
the intendment of rule 34, that the information sought was protected
under the "executive privilege" doctrine, and under a claim that
"strong public policy prohibits the disclosure of the internal affairs
of government agencies."58
On the question of whether the taxpayer had shown "good cause,"
the Government argued that it had made available various Internal
Revenue agents for oral depositions, and that the taxpayer could pro-
ceed by interrogatories to discover the criteria used by government
agents in disallowing the challenged deductions. The court's answer to
this argument was that a reading of the depositions indicated that the
taxpayer was making no progress in eliciting from the government
agents the information which it now sought through production of
documents. Again addressing itself to the matter of the taxpayer's
showing of "good cause" for the production of the documents, the
Government argued that the taxpayer had the burden of proving that
it had overpaid its taxes and that this burden was not satisfied merely
by showing that the Government was in error in asserting additional
taxes against the taxpayer. The court treated this as an argument
by the Government that the materials sought contained evidence which
was immaterial for purposes of the proceeding. The district judge
stated that he agreed with the Government on the proposition that it
was not a part of the taxpayer's burden in a tax refund suit to prove
that the Internal Revenue Service acted in a capricious manner and,
accordingly, that he agreed with the Government that the production
of documents revealing the process of determination used by the
Internal Revenue Service would not further the plaintiff's case. How-
ever, the judge went on to say that the Government's contentions and
reasoning processes which might be revealed by the requested documents
could lead to a discovery of the Government's possible bases for defense
of the case and that, under the discovery rules, it was proper for the
plaintiff to discover not only facts material to the presentation of his
case, but also to discover facts which might be used by his opponent as
a defense.
The Government argued that the reasoning used by an Internal
Revenue agent in reaching his decision is irrelevant with respect to
a memorandum regarding a conversation between an official in a field office and a
coordinator in the national office of the Internal Revenue Service; transmittal letters
from field agents; reports of a Technical Advisor and a special assistant in the field
office and communications between the Internal Revenue Service and outside parties.
The taxpayer also sought an order compelling a special assistant in the Appellate
Division of the Internal Revenue Service to answer a question on deposition regarding
the criteria he used in deciding to disallow certain of the taxpayer's deductions for
advertising expense.
58. 38 F.R.D. at 60.
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the issues in the case. The court disposed of this argument by observ-
ing that under the federal discovery rules it is not necessary that the
moving party show that the evidence he seeks will be admissible. It
is enough if the moving party shows that the materials he seeks may
lead him to admissible evidence.
Turning to the Government's argument with respect to the "executive
privilege," the court first observed that it was no longer open to question
that the final determination of a claim of executive privilege was within
the province of the court and beyond the powers of the representatives of
the Executive Branch of the Government. The court then pointed out
that the so-called "executive privilege" was a privilege designed to
protect the secrecy of military information or state papers. 9 It is sub-
mitted that it would be a rare case indeed where the opening of a federal
tax audit file would reveal military or state secrets.
The court next turned to the Government's argument that it
was contrary to public policy to reveal matters related to the internal
management of government agencies. On this point, the court said:
Public policy decisions are essentially ad hoc decisions. They
call upon the Judge to exercise a restrained discretion after weigh-
ing the supplicant interests before him. Of course, precedent is to
be relied on as persuasive direction, but the court is at least partially
released from the stricture of stare decisis.6°
The court dismissed as groundless the Government's assertion that
the so-called "housekeeping" statute6' furnished a basis for a refusal of
an employee of the executive branch to produce government files. The
court observed that if the "housekeeping" statute had ever been operable
as a defense against discovery of government files, the defense disap-
peared with the 1958 amendment to that Act which expressly provided
that the Act was not to be considered as conferring on an executive
department a privilege against disclosing matters to the public. 2
59. The court stated the executive privilege rule as follows:
We are not confronted here with a cloak of secrecy around military information
or state papers. The foundation of executive privilege is the unfortunately
necessary policy of fettering justice to promote national health. It is, in effect, a
choice between the lesser of two evils: on the one hand, we have half-informed
litigants who some times get justice, if at all, by accident; on the other hand,
we might have disruptive publicity of documents, plans and policies which by
their very nature must be secret to be effective. When such secrets relate to the
very preservation of this nation, involving the formulation of national policy or
the process of national defense there will be no exposure. . . . But there is no
claim here that such important matters are involved. Id. at 63.
60. Id. at 64.
61. Departmental regulations. The head of each department is authorized to
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his depart-
ment, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of
its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and
property appertaining to it. 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1927).
62. 72 Stat. 547 (1958).
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In the course of the opinion in the Timken Roller Bearing case,
the Kaiser case6 3 was distinguished on the ground that in Kaiser the
plaintiff had not shown any need to examine the opinions and advices
of the subordinate government officials. Having examined the extant
discovery cases in the tax field, 4 the judge found "an almost equal
division of authority"6 with respect to the Government's right to
withhold files of the Internal Revenue Service. He concluded that the
pro-government cases with respect to the privilege against discovery
of Internal Revenue Service files were either distinguishable on their
facts or were cases in which the taxpayer had failed to show a need for
examination of the documents. The court thereupon ordered the de-
manded documents to be produced and ordered the revenue agent to
answer questions relating to his criteria for disallowance of the
taxpayer's deductions. The court temporarily excepted from the pro-
duction order documents having to do with communications between the
Internal Revenue Service and third parties. As to these, the court
ordered an examination in camera to determine whether they involved
the informer's privilege.
The court in Timken Roller Bearing found historical support for
its ruling:
We find support for disclosure in the cry of certain irate
Bostonians who once coined a phrase, which once had meaning,
about "taxation without representation." The founders of this
country rebelled again[st] and divorced us from that system of
tyrannical taxation by secret enactment. Does it make any differ-
ence to the taxpayer whether a levy is passed in secret, or that the
execution of that levy is processed in secret? We think not. There-
fore, if our decision be based on policy considerations, we find
every reason in precedent and principle for formulating a policy
of disclosure. 6
Recently, in Lenske v. United States, 7 the Government secured
the conviction of an attorney for criminal tax fraud. The court of ap-
peals was obviously shocked by the methods used by the Government
in investigating and prosecuting the defendant. Court of Claims Judge
Madden, sitting by designation, wrote the opinion of the court of appeals
which reversed the conviction. The reversal was, in large part, based
upon the court's reaction to the special agent's memorandum to his
63. See pp. 75-76 supra.
64. See Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513 (W.D. Tex. 1963); Cenname v.
Bingler, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. fT 15,346 (W.D. Pa. 1961); E. W. Bliss Co. v. United
States, 203 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1961) ; Frazier v. Phinney, 24 F.R.D. 406 (S.D.
Tex. 1959).
65. 38 F.R.D. at 67.
66. Id. at 69.
67. 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9,686 (9th Cir. 1966).
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superiors recommending prosecution of the defendant. The memoran-
dum listed the following as reasons for prosecution: representatives of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the local police department
had stated that they believed the defendant was a Communist; the de-
fendant had participated in the formation of a local chapter of the
Lawyers' Guild; the defendant entertained undesirable "thinking on
the subject of Cuba, Laos, China, etc. ' 6'  The court concluded: "We
reverse. This court will not place its stamp of approval upon a witch-
hunt, a crusade to rid society of unorthodox thinkers and actors by
using federal income tax laws and federal courts to put such people
in the penitentiary. This court will not be so used."
'69
This decision by the Ninth Circuit stands for the proposition
that the motive of the prosecuting authorities has some relevance in
criminal tax proceedings. If the motives of government agents are
relevant in criminal proceedings, there seems to be no sound reason
why motives of government agents are not relevant in civil tax proceed-
ings. Thus, if the taxpayer has reason to believe, or even suspect,
that an agent of the Internal Revenue Service has recommended assess-
ment of additional taxes or denial of his refund claim on the basis of
a motive unconnected with the protection of the Government's revenue,
the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Lenske indicates that the taxpayer
is entitled to at least discover this fact. Thus, the discovery of ulterior
motives of government employees may, in itself, be a basis for discovery
of reports by revenue agents to their superiors or fellow agents.
Hopefully, it would be a rare case in which an official of the
Internal Revenue Service would misuse his authority for the purpose
of harassing a taxpayer or for some other purpose unconnected with the
collection of revenue. However rare such an occurrence might be, it
nonetheless seems appropriate that a taxpayer who suspects that an
agent is acting for improper reasons should be given the opportunity
to discover whether there is any basis for his suspicion, and the agent's
reports and memoranda in the government files are possible sources
of information about the agent's motives.
The decisions in cases in which taxpayers" have sought discovery
of government files and particularly those parts of files setting forth the
68. Id. at 87,239.
69. Id. at 87,240.
70. Rulings in nontax cases with respect to discovery of intra-agency reports
showing opinions, mental processes, and motives of government agents, like rulings on
similar matters in tax cases, are not easy to reconcile. Cf., e.g., United States v. 50.34
Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (refusing discovery of statements of
government employee as to value in condemnation case) ; United States v. 900.57
Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark. 1962) (refusing discovery of government
appraiser's report in condemnation action) ; United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land,
32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963) (allowing discovery of basis of valuation by govern-
ment appraiser in a condemnation case).
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opinions and recommendations of government officials indicate the fol-
lowing general propositions regarding the attitudes of the courts:
1. Where the Government is the plaintiff (as in a suit to
recover an allegedly erroneous refund), the courts tend to be
extremely liberal in permitting taxpayer inspection of government
files.
2. In cases in which the Government is the defendant, the
courts are reluctant to order wholesale revelation of the contents
of government files absent a convincing showing by the taxpayer
that: (a) the Government is deliberately concealing certain facts
from the taxpayer in order to hamper his preparation for trial;
(b) the court is convinced that there may be information in the
Government's files which will form the basis for a government
defense at the trial; (c) the taxpayer has no other means of secur-
ing access to the information in the Government's files; or (d)
the taxpayer can demonstrate a real possibility that he will be
unprepared for trial, (including rebuttal of the Government's
defense) unless he is given access to the requested documents.
A reading of a great number of trial court orders and opinions
relating to pretrial discovery leads one to the conclusion that some of
the decisions can only be explained on the basis that "deep down" the
judge felt that the person opposing discovery was attempting to gain
an unfair advantage over his opponent by concealing evidence, or that
the party seeking discovery had an ulterior motive.71 Judges hearing
motions with respect to discovery matters are much like the chancellors
of whom it was said: "When the flush comes to the chancellor's cheek
he is prepared to fashion his decree."
IV. PRIVILEGES EXEMPTING THE GOVERNMENT FROM DIsCOVERY
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court of Claims'
Rules dealing with discovery all recognize that discovery is limited
by overriding rules of privilege. As indicated by some of the prior
discussion, the Government, like other litigants, frequently opposes
discovery on the ground that the matter sought to be discovered is
privileged.
A. The Executive Privilege
The Government, in resisting discovery, often alleges that the
matter sought to be disclosed is protected by a so-called "executive
71. For an interesting public confession about judicial reactions of this sort, see
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
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privilege. '72 As advanced by the Government in this context, "execu-
tive privilege" is an extremely plastic concept. When the Government
opposes discovery on the grounds of "executive privilege," it points to
a number of foundations for the privilege and attempts to envelop
within the privilege a great miscellany of information possessed by
the executive departments of the Government.
The landmark case in the field of "executive privilege" is United
States v. Reynolds,73 although it is interesting to note that the phrase
"executive privilege" does not appear in the Supreme Court's opinion.
Reynolds involved a tort claim arising out of the crash of an Air Force
plane engaged in a secret research project. The Government resisted
the plaintiffs' motion under rule 34 for the production of the Air
Force's official accident investigation reports and the statements of
three crew members taken in connection with the official investigation
of the crash which resulted in the deaths of the plaintiffs' husbands.
The original basis for the Government's resistance to the motion for
production was the Air Force regulations promulgated pursuant to
the "housekeeping" statute74 which provided that the head of each
executive department was authorized to prescribe regulations covering,
inter alia, "the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers
and property appertaining to it."7 5 As previously indicated, if there
was ever anything in the "housekeeping" statute upon which to base
an executive privilege against disclosure of information, it has been
obliterated by virtue of the 1958 amendment which added to the section
the following: "This section does not authorize withholding informa-
tion from the public or limiting the availability of records to the
public."
76
In the Reynolds case, the district court held that by virtue of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the Government had waived its executive
privilege and it ordered the Government to produce the demanded docu-
ments for examination by the court so that the latter could determine
whether they contained any privileged matters.77 The Government de-
clined to show the demanded documents to the court and the district
court thereupon entered an order pursuant to rule 37(b) (2) (i) to the
72. For an excellent and detailed discussion of this privilege, see Paubeneck &
Sexton, Executive Privilege and the Court's Right to Know - Discovery Against
the United States in Civil Actions in Federal District Courts, 48 GEo. L.J. 486 (1960).
See also Asbill & Snell, Scope of Discovery Against the United States, 7 VAND. L.
Rgv. 582 (1954) ; O'Riley, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of
Sovereign Immunity?, 21 N.C.L. Rgv. 1 (1942).
73. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
76. 72 Stat. 547 (1958).
77. Reynolds v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (1950).
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effect that the facts in the case with respect to the issue of negligence
would be taken as established in the plaintiffs' favor by virtue of the
Government's refusal to permit discovery. This decision of the district
court was affirmed by the court of appeals.7"
The Supreme Court in deciding the appeal was obviously concerned
about the implications of the case.7" The majority of the Court studi-
ously avoided laying down any all-encompassing general rule with
respect to the right of the executive branch to disclose, or refuse to
disclose, materials, the revelation of which, in the opinion of the execu-
tive branch, would seriously interfere with national security or the
conduct of foreign relations. The Court was obviously trying to avoid
painting itself into a corner. Nonetheless, in Reynolds, the Supreme
Court did expound some definite propositions with respect to the execu-
tive privilege. The Court made it clear that it was only considering
a privilege against revealing military secrets - which the Court de-
scribed as "a privilege which is well established in the law of evi-
dence."8 The Court stated that the privilege must be asserted by the
head of the executive department which has control over the matter
and must be asserted "after actual personal consideration by that
officer." 81 However, no dogmatic rule was laid down as to how far
a court could go in forcing a disclosure to the court of matters for
which the head of an executive department claimed a privilege. In
describing this dilemma the court explained: "The court itself must
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing
the privilege is designed to protect.
' 82
The Court stated the following as the rule governing how far the
trial court must go in requiring the executive branch to disclose ma-
terials which it claims are privileged:
Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically
require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of
privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy
the court, from all the circumstances of the case that there is a
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interests of national security, should
not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the
security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon
78. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951).
79. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (Justices Black, Frankfurter,
and Jackson dissented).
80. 345 U.S. at 6-7.
81. Id. at 8.
82. Id.
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an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in
chambers.
In the instant case we cannot escape judicial notice that this
[1952 and 1953] is a time of vigorous preparation for national
defense .... On the record before the trial court it appeared that
this accident occurred to a military plane which had gone aloft
to test secret electronic equipment. Certainly there was a reasonable
danger that the accident investigation report would contain
references to the secret electronic equipment which was the primary
concern of the mission. 3
The Court went on to weigh the plaintiffs' need to examine the
demanded documents against the interests of the executive branch in
preventing disclosure of vital military secrets. The synthesis of the
decision in the Reynolds case was to tell the trial courts to weigh in
each case the plaintiff's necessity against the apparent necessity for
preservation of military secrets and, on the basis of how the scales
balance, to then decide whether to require the executive branch to pro-
duce the demanded documents for examination by the judge. Thus,
the Court laid down no fixed guidelines for the lower courts, but
instead urged upon the trial courts a judicial weighing of the competing
considerations presented when a citizen demands to know what is in
the Government's files and the Government asserts that to reveal it
would be detrimental to the national security.
In applying this analysis to the facts at hand in Reynolds the
Supreme Court, after weighing the competing considerations, found
that the right of the Government to protect military secrets, as asserted
in that case, outweighed the necessity of the plaintiffs to examine the
documents, especially in view of the offer of the Government to make
three survivors of the crash available as witnesses.
A sometimes advanced basis for the assertion of the executive
privilege is that to permit a court to order an official in the executive
branch to produce documents or to give evidence would be violative
of the separation of powers doctrine. This argument is generally coupled
with citations to instances where the various departments in the execu-
tive branch have refused to comply with demands by congressional
committees for the production of documents or the giving of testimony
before congressional committees. An argument that the judicial branch
(like the legislative branch) has no authority to compel disclosure of
materials held by the executive branch, is completely dissipated, how-
ever, once the Government waives its sovereign immunity against suit
83. Id. at 10.
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and agrees to submit itself to the jurisdiction of its own courts.8 4
If the issuance of a final judicial decree ordering a department in the
executive branch to pay over money to a taxpayer is not violative of
the separation of powers doctrine, it is difficult to understand how the
doctrine is violated when, in the process of reaching a just decision
with respect to whether the Government owes a taxpayer money, the
court orders a department in the executive branch to produce evidence
which will enable the court to reach a correct decision.
The decisions since Reynolds have almost uniformly held that the
so-called "executive privilege" relates only to the privilege against dis-
closure of matters bearing upon national security, military secrets,
and secrets of state having to do with our relations with other govern-
ments. 5 It is justifiable to protect this type of material from discovery
in tax litigation. However, instances in which this privilege will be
properly applicable are certainly limited.
B. The Informer's Privilege
Like the so-called "executive privilege," the privilege against re-
vealing the identities of informers is peculiarly available to the Govern-
ment. In Roviaro v. United Statess" the Supreme Court described the
informer's privilege as "the Government's privilege to withhold from
disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations
of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.""7 It has been
held that the informer's privilege is applicable with respect to informants
assisting in the enforcement of the non-criminal laws as well as to
informants in criminal prosecutions.88 As was made clear in the
Roviaro case, the privilege is not absolute and is one which is con-
siderably circumscribed by exceptions and limitations. In Roviaro, the
informer, whose identity was sought by the criminal defendant, had
been an actual participant in the alleged narcotic sale which formed the
basis for the defendant's indictment. Under those circumstances the
Court held that the informer's privilege was inapplicable. The Court
also pointed out that the informer's privilege does not bar disclosure
of the contents of a communication from an informer where such dis-
closure will not reveal the identity of the informer. Also, where the
identity of the informer has already been disclosed to those who would
84. Cf. Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255, 257-58 (W.D. La. 1950)
Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
85. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D.
Ohio 1964) ; United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964) ; United States v.
San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
86. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
87. Id. at 59.
88. See In re Gurnsey, 223 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1963).
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"have cause to resent the communication,"89 the privilege is inapplicable.
The most permeating exception to the informer's privilege was stated
by the Court in Roviaro, as follows:
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises
from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the dis-
closure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his com-
munication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused,
or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must
give way. In these situations the trial court may require dis-
closure and, if the government withholds the information, dismiss
the action.90
It is clear that in tax litigation the informer's privilege may well
be applicable and available to the Government as a basis for a refusal
to divulge the identities and communications of persons who volun-
tarily come forward to inform the Government about violations of the
Internal Revenue laws. Applying the informer's privilege in a tax
case, however, immediately raises the problem of who is an "informer."
For purposes of the privilege, a person who, without any solicita-
tion on the part of the Government, writes to or visits a government
agent to reveal knowledge about another person's violations of the
Internal Revenue laws, would qualify as an informer. On the other
hand, if the Government is already investigating the tax liabilities of
a taxpayer and in the course of such investigation a government em-
ployee initiates an interview with a third party, it is doubtful that such
third party could qualify as an informer for purposes of the privilege
even though the person reveals information which might not have
otherwise been available to the Government. Since a stated purpose
of the informer's privilege is to encourage citizens to come forward
and communicate their knowledge regarding violations of the law to
government officials, 9 the purpose would not be effectuated by extend-
ing the privilege to persons who do not come forward and voluntarily
give information to the Government, but who must be sought out in the
course of an investigation.92 By a parity of reasoning it likewise would
seem that the purpose of the privilege is not served by protecting the
identity of persons who are employed either on a full-time or a part-time
basis to report violations of Internal Revenue laws to the Government.
89. 353 U.S. at 60.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 59.
92. See Carrow, Government Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA.
L. Rev. 166, 182 (1958), where in describing the informer in the Roviaro case, the
author pointed out: "By thus becoming a participant in the investigative process, the
underlying purpose of the informer privilege, namely, the encouragement of private citi-
zens to bring to the attention of law enforcement officers violations of law is dissolved."
FALL 1967]
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
These persons do not need the encouragement derived from a privilege
against the revelation of their identities to do that for which they are
hired.
In any event, in most tax litigation, as long as the content of the
communication is available to a taxpayer under the aforementioned
qualification to the informer's privilege, the assertion of the privilege
should not present a practical barrier to the taxpayer in adequately
framing and structuring his case.
C. The Attorney's Work Product Privilege
Hickman v. Taylor" is the foundation of practically all present
American rules with respect to the privilege which has come to be
known as the "attorney's work product privilege." The holding of the
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor has been summarized by Profes-
sor Moore as follows:
(1) Information as to facts of the case and statements of wit-
nesses obtained by the adverse party's attorney are not
within the common-law attorney-client privilege;
(2) Even the broader policy against invasion of the attorney's
privacy and freedom in the preparation of the case does not
make them absolutely immune, but
(3) The party asking for disclosure is bound to show that the
situation is a rare one having exceptional features which make
the disclosure necessary in the interests of justice; and
(4) Where the party seeking discovery has obtained or is able to
obtain the information asked for elsewhere, he has not met
the burden. 4
The limits of the holding in Hickman v. Taylor have been the
subject of considerable controversy and litigation and are likely to
remain so. However, for purposes of applying the rule of Hickman v.
Taylor in connection with discovery against the Government in civil
tax litigation, there are certain clearly defined limits with respect to
the attorney's work product privilege.
In the first place, the privilege is only applicable with respect to
information secured by an attorney for a party in connection with
preparation for litigation. The privilege is not applicable to the work
product of a person not acting as an attorney in the course of securing
information or materials, even though such person happens to be a
lawyer. Thus, materials assembled by agents of the Federal Bureau of
93. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
94. J. Moogr, FEDERAL PRACTICE i 26.23 [8.1], at 1381 (2d ed. 1953).
[VOL. 13 : p. 58
33
Murdoch: Discovery against the United States in Civil Tax Proceedings
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
CIVIL TAX PROCEEDINGS
Investigation, while acting as investigating agents for the Department
of Justice, are not protected under Hickman merely because some of
the agents happen to be members of the bar." Many Internal Revenue
agents are members of the bar, however, unless they are acting in the
role of attorneys for the Government and in connection with preparation
for litigation, the materials gathered by such agents are not within
the attorney's work product rule. On the other hand, the attorney's
work product privilege is applicable to materials gathered by govern-
ment agents acting under the express directions of government at-
torneys in connection with preparation for litigation to the same
extent as if such materials had been gathered directly by the attorneys."6
Any other rule would make the Hickman decision meaningless when
applied to the Government in important litigation. The press of matters
handled by government attorneys, coupled with the geographical prob-
lems faced by Department of Justice attorneys stationed in Washing-
ton, who are responsible for trials in courts scattered over the entire
United States, means that the government attorneys must perforce
rely on investigating agents throughout the United States to take state-
ments and assemble materials needed at trial. Accordingly, the rule
of Hickman, if otherwise applicable, applies to materials gathered by
Internal Revenue agents at the direct request of Department of Justice
or Internal Revenue Service attorneys, at least after the case has
reached the litigation stages.
In the ordinary tax case, a government attorney enters the picture
only after there has been considerable investigative work by regular or
special agents of the Internal Revenue Service. Materials assembled by
such agents prior to the case being assigned to a government attorney
are not protected by the attorney's work product privilege.97 On the
other hand, the attorney's work product rule would probably be ap-
plicable in a situation where a government attorney had entered the
case even though litigation had not yet commenced. Support for this
proposition is found in Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields."8
The court there extended the attorney's work product privilege to inves-
tigation reports prepared by an attorney working in the plaintiff's legal
95. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948) rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
96. See, e.g., United States v. American Optical Co., 37 F.R.D. 233 (E.D. Wisc.
1965); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 34 F.R.D. 241, 243 (E.D. Mo.
1963) ; United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
97. See Burke v. United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that
reports of investigation of an accident secured by post office personnel before an
action was filed by the injured party were not protected under the work product of
the attorney rule) ; Royal Exchange Assurance v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) (holding the attorney's work product privilege inapplicable to reports of an in-
vestigator for the Department of Justice prepared before the lawsuit was commenced).
98. 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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department even though such reports were completed before an action
was actually begun, but when the reports were prepared "with an eye
towards litigation."99 Thus, if it becomes obvious to the government
representatives during the course of an audit that litigation will ensue
and if, at that point, an attorney (acting as such for the United States)
enters the case, it would seem that the attorney's work product rule is
thereafter applicable with respect to materials secured by the attorney
in preparation for trial or secured by others under the attorney's
direction.
The attorney's work product rule, however, does not operate retro-
actively. Thus, revenue agents' reports and similar materials prepared
or assembled prior to the time that a government attorney entered
the case cannot be brought under the umbrella of the attorney's work
product privilege by the simple device of being later incorporated into
the government attorney's file."'°
The Government normally uses its attorneys only during the later
stages of an audit (i.e., after the non-attorney government personnel
and the taxpayer's representative have been unable to settle the matter
short of litigation). On the other hand, taxpayers are inclined to use
attorneys at earlier stages of the audit. Since much of the govern-
ment's investigative material has been assembled prior to the govern-
nient attorney's entry into the case, the coverage of the work product
privilege is much narrower in the case of a government file than in
the case of the file of a taxpayer's representative.
D. Attorney-Client Privilege
Several years ago there was a furor caused by the later reversed
decision of the district court in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n."'0 which cast doubt upon the availability of the attorney-client
privilege to other than individual clients. However, the law in this
area seems to have jelled to the point where it can be assumed that
the attorney-client privilege is applicable to communications between
government employees and attorneys employed by the Department of
Justice and the Internal Revenue Service to the same extent as it is
to communications between private individual clients and their at-
torneys.10 2 Accordingly, in tax litigation, it should be assumed that
99. Id. at 7.
100. See In re Colton, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
951 (1963).
101. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) rev'd 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
102. In Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884), the Supreme Court held privileged
communications between a private citizen and a prosecuting attorney with respect to
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discovery with respect to confidential communications between govern-
ment employees and government attorneys will be inhibited by the
attorney-client confidential communications privilege. But, since the
attorney-client privilege is limited to confidential communications be-
tween the client and the attorney, the privilege would not be available
with respect to communications between government attorneys and per-
sons who are not government employees. °3 For example, communica-
tions between independent real estate valuation experts and government
attorneys would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The unavailability of the privilege in such a situation can be im-
portant to a taxpayer's lawyer who believes an expert interviewed by
the government attorney may have expressed opinions or knows facts
adverse to the government's contentions.
V. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
On July 4, 1966, the President approved the bill which is popu-
larly known as the Freedom of Information Act.1 4 The Act is an
amendment of section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act having
to do with the duty of executive departments to make available to the
public materials in the files of the departments. The Act became ef-
fective July 4, 1967 - one year after its approval. While the Act is
not directed specifically at discovery procedures, its provisions and the
legislative history are certain to influence courts in deciding what
information must be made available by the Government in connection
with civil tax litigation.
It is beyond the scope of this article to set forth a complete exposi-
tion of the Freedom of Information Act."0 5 However, certain provisions
of this Act will affect the availability of information in the possession
of the Internal Revenue Service, and, therefore, to the extent relevant,
the Act will be considered.
the citizen's inquiry regarding submission of a matter to the grand jury. There the
Supreme Court based its decision on two privileges - the attorney-client privilege
and the informer privilege. The fact that an attorney is employed (i.e., is a "house
counsel") rather than a retained private practitioner does not, by itself, affect the
availability of the attorney-client privilege. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962) ; City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950).
103. The informer's privilege or the attorney's work product privilege might be
available with respect to such communications.
104. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) [hereinafter cited by section only].
105. For an excellent article on the effect of the Act with respect to matters
having to do with enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws, see Sexton, New Law
Changes Rules on What Information I.R.S. Must Disclose; Confusion Likely, 26 J.
OF TAXATION 120 (1967). See generally ATT'y GEN., MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC
INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1967). Published in
June of 1967, the memorandum recites much of the background of the Act and gives
the views of the Department of Justice regarding the scope of the Act.
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The provision of the Freedom of Information Act most likely to
become involved in discovery proceedings in tax litigation is the new
section 3(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act which provides, in
part:
Every agency shall, upon request for identifiable records made in
accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees to
the extent authorized by statute and procedure to be followed,
make such records promptly available to any person.
Read literally, the foregoing would seem to permit any taxpayer,
whether or not involved in litigation, to demand all "identifiable rec-
ords" having to do with his own affairs. The Act, however, provides
certain exemptions from the agency duty to furnish records. The
principal exemptions likely to be significant in tax litigation are those
exempting matters which are: "trade secrets and commercial or finan-
cial information obtained from any person and privileged or confiden-
tial' 11 6 (this would seem to exempt information with respect to other
taxpayers' affairs but not information with respect to the litigating
taxpayers' own affairs); "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a private party in
litigation with the agency' 10 7 (this exemption would seem to be no more
than an attempt to incorporate in the statute existing rules with respect
to information privileged from discovery in litigation) ;10' and "inves-
tigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent
available by law to a private party"'0° (here again, the exemption seems
to be no more than an attempt to adopt by reference the myriad privilege
rules developed through litigation).
One might well suppose on the basis of the just-quoted exemptions
that the Freedom of Information Act puts litigating taxpayers in exactly
the same position that they occupied prior to the adoption of the Act.
In the opinion of this writer, this is not the situation, and, to the con-
trary, the Freedom of Information Act will, in time, considerably
affect the availability of discovery against the United States in tax
cases.
The Act provides that any person refused access to agency records
may file a complaint in the district court for the district in which the
party resides, has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situate, to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
106. Section 3(e) (4).
107. Section 3(e) (5).
108. See pp. 75-84 supra. The case law developments regarding discovery will
have continued and increased significance because of the relationship to section 3(e) (5).
109. Section 3(e) (7).
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records and for an order for the production of the same. n ° This pro-
vision alone can have startling effects in connection with pretrial dis-
covery. The provision for securing district court orders for the pro-
duction of agency records is not limited to situations in which there
is litigation pending or even contemplated. This means that a form of
pre-petition discovery can be secured well in advance of the commence-
ment of litigation. More importantly, the provision can have the effect
of permitting taxpayers who are litigating, or intend to litigate, their
tax liabilities in the Tax Court to engage in a form of discovery which,
to date, has been largely unavailable in Tax Court proceedings. All of
these observations and possibilities will probably be tested in litigation
soon after the Act becomes effective.
In terms of the effect on discovery proceedings in litigation with
the United States, the comments in the committee reports are as im-
portant as the text of the Freedom of Information Act. The committee
reports reflect an unmistakable determination on the part of Congress
to insure that the executive departments make full disclosures of their
affairs except to the extent specifically inhibited by the Act itself or by
other clear-cut rules of law."' If there was ever any doubt about the
proposition, the committee reports accompanying the Freedom of In-
formation Act make it abundantly clear that it is the intention of
Congress, wherever there is doubt with respect to the duty of executive
departments to disclose matters to the public, to resolve the doubt in
favor of disclosure. It is submitted that the courts, in deciding issues
with respect to the breadth of discovery, will be influenced by this clear
statement of policy on the part of congressional committees concerned
with the problems affected by the Act.
On July 1, 1967, the Treasury Department published regulations
with respect to the applicability of the Freedom of Information Act
to the records and proceedings of the Internal Revenue Service." 2 The
new regulations recite the prior practice of the Internal Revenue
Service in connection with publication in the Federal Register, the
Internal Revenue Bulletins, and elsewhere of rules, regulations, and
procedures of the Internal Revenue Service. The tenor of the new
regulation gives little encouragement to any hope that the Freedom of
110. Section 3(c)(6). An interesting question may be precipitated by the fact
that a recently proposed regulation (proposed Treas. Reg. § 601.702(b)(9), 32 Fed.
Reg. 9545 (1967)) provides for an administrative appeal to the Commissioner when
a request for records is denied. A one month period is specified as the maximum
time in which an appeal must be decided. It seems at least arguable that a district
court would not feel compelled to apply the common law doctrine requiring exhaustion
of administrative remedies in light of the clear mandate in the Act to expeditiously
handle suits instituted pursuant to section 3(c) (6).
111. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; H.R. RnP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
112. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 601.601-02, 601.701-02, 32 Fed. Reg. 9541-46 (1967).
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Information Act will cause the Internal Revenue Service to become
more liberal in making information available to taxpayers. The regu-
lation states that the Freedom of Information Act does not require
that letter rulings to taxpayers be made available to other taxpayers."'
The announced basis for this position is that such letter rulings do not
have "precedential significance." Tax practitioners who have been
refused favorable rulings or who have received adverse rulings on the
basis of prior unpublished letter rulings to other taxpayers will dispute
the proposition that such prior rulings do not have "precedential
significance."
Less than a month before the Freedom of Information Act became
effective, the Treasury Department published Treasury Decision 6920..
instructing Internal Revenue Service employees with respect to pro-
cedures to be followed in the event they are subpoenaed to produce In-
ternal Revenue Service records or to testify regarding information with
respect to the Internal Revenue Service. The thrust of this regulation
is that, absent expressly decreed procedures to the contrary, Service
employees who are so subpoenaed are to respectfully decline to give
information or produce records until the matter is reviewed by the Com-
missioner. Compliance with T.D. 6920 will greatly impede the progress
of pretrial discovery through examination of Internal Revenue person-
nel. Unless the courts step in and limit the application of T.D. 6920,
it is easy to imagine that the practice of revenue agents "taking the
6920th" will become more commonplace than criminal defendants
"taking the fifth."
VI CONCLUSION
If pretrial discovery of matters within the knowledge of the Gov-
ernment is important to the proper presentation of a taxpayer's case, a
refund suit in a federal district court is the best route to follow, a refund
suit in the Court of Claims ranks as a close second, and a proceeding
in the Tax Court runs a poor third. Nevertheless, there are encouraging
signs that the Tax Court, of its own volition, or as a result of appellate
court decisions, may be moving in the direction of adopting modern
discovery procedures." 5
113. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 601.702(b) (1), 32 Fed. Reg. 9543 (1967).
114. 32 Fed. Reg. 8240-42 (1967).
115. In Rice v. Stoepler, 267 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich. 1967), the court dismissed
a taxpayer's petition for a writ of mandamus to order a district director to reveal the
name of the Internal Revenue Service official who approved a refund to petitioner.
There was no Tax Court proceeding or refund suit pending at the time. The court
held that the taxpayer was not entitled to an extraordinary writ of mandamus when
the taxpayer would be able to secure the requested information through "appropriate
discovery procedures if and when this matter is ever brought before the tax court or
the district court in a refund action." Id. at 178-79 (emphasis added).
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Because of the practically plenary power of the Government to
discover all facts with respect to a taxpayer's case during the audit
stages, the courts should be liberal in permitting broad discovery of
the Government's side of a tax case once litigation has commenced.
The trend of decisions in the field of civil tax litigation, as in
all fields of civil litigation, is in the direction of ever broader pretrial
discovery. Likewise, the courts, in passing on objections to discovery
based on testimonial privileges, shy away from absolutes and incline
toward weighing considerations which counter-balance assertions of
privilege. The just-stated generalization regarding testimonial privi-
leges is particularly true with respect to the privileges which are
peculiar to the Government, i.e., the executive privilege and the in-
former's privilege.
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